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New Frontiers in EEC Air
Transport Competition
I. INTRODUCTION
From its very inception in 1957, the European Economic Commu-
nity ("Community" or "EEC") has sought, through the EEC Treaty, "to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities." 1 This development is to be accomplished, among other
means, through "the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of trans-
port"2 and "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted."3 It has never been clear, however,
whether the competition rules set out in the EEC Treaty specifically ap-
ply to "a harmonious development" of the EEC air transport industry
and its pricing procedures.4
Since 1974, the European Court of Justice ("Court" or "Court of
Justice") has held air transport subject to general treaty rules.' Several
commentators maintain that such general rules include the competition
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
art. 2 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)[hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2 Id., art. 3(e).
3 Id., art. 3(f). The EEC Treaty competition provisions are set forth in Articles 85 and 86. For
the text of these articles, see infra note 6.
4 Article 84(2) makes an exception from rules affecting general transport for sea and air trans-
port, subject to any implementing rules put out by the Commission; no such implementing rules
have ever been formulated. Implementing rules for competition in other sectors have been previ-
ously specified in Council Regulation Number 17, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), O.J. COMM. EUR. 87 (special 1959-1962
English ed.) (1972), as amended, and Regulation Number 141, 124 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2751 (1962).
Regulation 141 specifically exempts sea and air transport from the provisions of Regulation 17.
5 Comm'n v. French Republic, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, [1974 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8270 (1974). See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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provisions set forth in Articles 85 and 86.6 However, attempts to obtain
an explicit ruling from the Court of Justice were unsuccessful7 until the
6 See Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6 EUR. L. Rv. 335 (1981);
Weber, Laker Airways v. The Ten Governments of the EEC-Comments on a Pending Case, 6 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 257, 267 (1981). Others feel that the issue has not been resolved, a position
which prompted the European Court of Justice ("Court" or "Court of Justice") to hand down the
New Frontiers ruling, the subject of this Note. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. See also
Comment, Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airline Industry, 15 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 364, 372 (1985).
The text of Article 85 is as follows:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall
hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of en-
terprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices;
which contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the pro-
motion of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share in the
profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the
attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial pro-
portion of the goods concerned.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
Article 86 provides as follows:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby, action by one
or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the Common
Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
Market and shall hereby be prohibited. Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of any
other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contract.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86.
7 Sir Freddie Laker, upon denial of a license by the British Civil Aviation Authority, tried to
bring to the attention of the London Court and the Court of Justice the monopolistic tendencies of
the aviation system. His business collapsed prior to any consideration of whether Articles 85 and 86
applied. Weber, supra note 6, at 258-60; Comment, supra note 6, at 383-84.
Lord Bethell, a Member of the British House of Lords and a leader in airline cartel breakup
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New Frontiers case,' when the Court addressed the issue directly.
In New Frontiers, the Court held that Member States' approval of
air fares contravened their treaty obligations when the fares resulted
from agreements or concerted practices prohibited by Article 85. 9 Thus,
the Court asserted the applicability of EEC competition rules to air
transport and specifically to price-fixing procedures within the EEC air-
line industry. The Court of Justice further found that the responsibility
for determining violations of the competition rules lies with the authori-
ties in Member States,1" and that Member States have a duty to refrain
from adoption or maintenance of practices that could render Articles 85
and 86 ineffective.1
This Note will examine the import of the New Frontiers decision,
from a theoretical and practical viewpoint, as it relates to the EEC air
transport industry. The decision, while rendering future deregulation of
the EEC air transport industry possible, fails to assure a smooth or effec-
tive change. First, the development of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments upon which the airline industry now relies will make it
exceedingly difficult for the Community to apply pure competition rules
to rate-making. In particular, rates have a tradition of regulation by the
International Air Transport Association ("IATA"), acting in conjunc-
tion with the individual Member States. Since most airlines within the
EEC are nationalized,12 Member States risk loss of considerable profit
attempts, also brought suit against the Commission of the European Communities ("Commission")
for allowing price-fixing to continue in violation of Article 85. The case was dismissed on grounds
that Lord Bethell had no direct interest in the outcome. See Leading Cases, Lord Bethell v. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 7 ANNALS Am & SPACE L. 599-600 (1982).
8 Ministare Public v. Asjes, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,774 (1986)(the Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. contains an unofficial translation since the official text is not yet re-
ported)[hereinafter New Frontiers]. "Nouvelles Fronti6res" was the name of one of the travel
agencies involved in the case, and the case has been popularly referred to by that name ("New
Frontiers" is the English translation). See generally EEC Air Transport Industry is Governed by
Treaty of Rome, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 953-54 (May 29, 1986)[hereinafter Air
Industry Governed by Treaty of Rome]; State Approval of Uniform Air Fares Violates Community
Competition Law, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1134 (June 19, 1986); EEC Still Has No
Policy on Liberalized Air Transport, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1171 (June 26,
1986)[hereinafter No Policy].
9 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,781. See infra notes 63-76 and accompany-
ing text.
10 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,780. See infra notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
11 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,780. See infra notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
12 Aer Lingus and Sabena are wholly owned by Ireland and Belgium, respectively. Air France,
Alitalia, KLM, and Lufthansa are also held primarily by the Member States in which they are
located. See Comment, supra note 6, at 365 n.7. Until its recent privatization, British Airways was
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and security in a free market. As a practical matter, Member States will
not be eager to implement the New Frontiers decision.
Further, the machinery of the EEC Commission ("Commission"),13
which is ultimately responsible for the behavior of the Member States, is
not known for its quick or efficient operation; 4 it may be years before
standards for rate competition are established.
After explaining the framework of international agreements and
general policy governing civil aviation in the EEC, and discussing prior
competition cases,' 5 this Note will then analyze the New Frontiers deci-
sion. The groundwork for an exploration of the difficulties in applying
and enforcing the decision16 is seen in this case's progress through the
French court system 7 and the various issues discussed by the Court of
Justice."8 This Note will end by examining the situation of private air-
lines in the aftermath of the decision. 9
II. AIR TRANSPORT IN THE EEC
A. The International Origins
The foundations of the modern international airline industry were
laid at the Chicago Convention in 1944 ("Convention"). z0 Those coun-
tries attending agreed to legal principles and institutional provisions by
which to standardize and develop civil aviation on a world scale. The
Convention recognized the basic "right for each country to control
flights in its territory," but left other details to agreements between par-
ticipating countries.2 l This agreement led to the creation of bilateral sys-
tems for "the exchange of commercial rights" between countries.22 Rate-
wholly owned by the British government; the airline continues as a national "flag carrier" and still
identifies closely with the government.
13 The Commission is one of four bodies governing the EEC. The other organizations are the
Parliament, the Council, and the Court of Justice. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
14 Formulating a written policy for air transport occurred within the bureaucratic offices of the
EEC over several years. See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text; see also No Policy, supra note
8.
15 See infra notes 20-54 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 77-131 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 132-143 and accompanying text.
20 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15
U.N.T.S. 295. See Hammarskjold, One World or Fragmentation: The Toll of Evolution in Interna-
tionalAir Transport, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 79, 80 (1984). Some 54 countries were represented
at the convention. See Comment, supra note 6, at 376 n.101.
21 p. Delsaux, The Airline Industry: A Comparative Study of the American and European Ap-
proaches 3 (1983)(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Northwestern University Law Library).
22 Hammarskjold, supra note 20, at 80.
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making was an area in which multilateral agreement at the Convention
was impossible; rates were therefore left to bilateral agreements.23
The present form of the IATA, created in Havana in 1945,24 further
defined the nature of the modem international airline industry. Coordi-
nating international air tariffs was one of the IATA's primary functions,
subject to approval by participating governments. Through such care-
fully regulated and "mutually supported protectionism," a "reliable" in-
ternational aviation system has developed.25
The Bermuda I Agreement between the United States and the
United Kingdom was the first major bilateral agreement following the
Convention, and one on which many subsequent agreements have been
modeled.2" Concluded in 1946, this agreement combined elements of
both bilateralism and multilateralism. It served as witness to the United
States "recognition of the need for overall coordination of rate-making
by airlines, which implied granting of antitrust immunity"-a major
achievement.27
This mixture of negotiated air traffic rights and standardized pricing
procedures was the basis for the development of international aviation.
More recent agreements preserved state air fare approval and usually in-
volved the IATA rate-making procedures. The 1977 Bermuda II Agree-
ment is an example.28
In 1978 the United States, long a proponent of competition in the
marketplace, 29 passed the Airline Deregulation Act in an attempt to in-
23 Id. at 81. The significance lies in the failure of participating countries to agree on an estab-
lished procedure for determining rates. The resulting bilateralism means that a country may have a
separate (and separately negotiated) rate agreement with every country with which it exchanges air
traffic rights; no uniform standards are necessarily applied.
24 See IN'L AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, THE FIRST THREE DECADES, 102 (1945). Headquartered in
Geneva, the IATA is a free association of airlines which operates international commercial air serv-
ices. It serves the needs of airlines and customers by coordinating airline procedures to provide
safer, more regular, and more economic air transport.
25 Dagtoglou, supra note 6, at 337. This regulation has also been responsible for the industry's
maintenance of prices. Id.
26 Air Services Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Jan. 15-Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [herein-
after Bermuda I Agreement].
27 Market entry was governed by a bilateral system that allowed the states to retain a degree of
control over competition; multilateralism resulted in standardized traffic rights and coordinated rate-
making. Hammarskjold, supra note 20, at 81-82.
28 Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland Concerning Air Services, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641
[hereinafter Bermuda II Agreement]. The IATA coordinates various air fares between states and
standardizes these fares to the extent possible. Recently, this role has emphasized lowering fares.
Hammarskjold, supra note 20, at 83.
29 The United States first official position discouraging monopoly and advocating competition
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troduce competition into its domestic market.30 The sudden discrepancy
between its free market domestic policy and controlled international pol-
icy led the United States to seek a more open market for international
aviation as well. 3 Pursuit of deregulation in the EEC, however, may
involve conflicts between the policies of the Community as a whole and
the Member States as independent entities.32
This complex tangle of bilateral agreement, multilateral regulation,
and "open skies"33 policy sets the stage for the New Frontiers case. Res-
olution of these issues rests upon the formulation of a coherent air trans-
port policy.
B. The Present EEC Policy
In 1977 the EEC Council ("Council"), in response to the Court's
ruling that general treaty rules apply to sea and air transport,3 4 created a
group to study and report on Community air transport.3 5 In the follow-
ing years, a formal Community policy on air transport evolved, espe-
cially with respect to its competitive position. Two official memoranda
detail that policy.
The First Memorandum,3 6 published by the Commission in 1979,
advocated immediate development of a "common air transport market"
and suggested measures covering pricing, employment policies, safety
rules, traffic rights, and competition. On the basis of this Memorandum,
the Council requested that the Commission develop proposals for interre-
gional air services and air fares.37
The Commission subsequently made two proposals which met with
began with the passage of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)(codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
30 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
31 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35
(1980). The Act reaffirms the United States competitive position in air transport with an eye to-
wards reducing consumer prices. For discussion of the key elements and policy goals behind this
legislation, see generally Recent Developments, The International Air Transportation Competition
Act of 1979, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 261-63 (1980).
32 See infra notes 81-114 and accompanying text.
33 The United States approach to free competition and a minimum of regulation is often referred
to as "open skies" policy. See U.S. v. Federal Communications Commission, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,205, at 75,358 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 29, 1978).
34 French Republic, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8270; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35 Stanbrook, Progress Towards a Community Policy on Air Transport, 10 EUR. L. REV. 52
(1985).
36 Air Transport: a Community Approach, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY (Supp. 5/79)(Memoran-
dum of the Commission).




resistance in the Council. The first proposal advocated opening the mar-
ket to new airlines.3" The second proposal dealt with air fares and the
application of competition rules.39 These proposals never emerged from
the Council as official policy because "[n]o Member State wanted its
dealings with its own airlines to become subject to Community rules."'
The Second Memorandum, 41 published in 1984, reflects the con-
cerns currently facing the EEC. Specifically, the Second Memorandum
discussed the impact of deregulation and concluded that a Community
air transport system was "not necessarily suitable for application to third
countries."42 It also recognized the need for rendering the present air
transport system "sufficiently flexible so as to contain within itself
enough pressure to ensure that airlines increase their productivity and
provide their services at the lowest possible cost. '43
The three measures proposed by the Commission to maintain such
flexibility included: "a) Community rules on certain points affecting the
content and method of application of the bilateral agreements and ar-
rangements which Member States conclude; b) action to amend the ma-
chinery for the settlement of air tariffs; c) action to limit the effect of
commercial and tariff agreements between airlines."'
As these three measures illustrate, the Commission's basic aim was
to apply the competition rules to air transport in the Community, but
exempt those Member States who indeed implemented such measures
during a period of adjustment.45 However, the Commission never offi-
cially adopted these proposals as regulations. The New Frontiers decision
emerged as the most definitive statement of these objectives.46
Although the EEC governing bodies debated many of the issues dis-
cussed in the New Frontiers decision, nothing binding on either the Com-
mission or the Member States ever emerged from the debate. The
situation was finally resolved by proceedings under Articles 85 and 86.
38 Id. 52, at 17.
39 Id. 68, at 19.
40 Id.
41 Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy, BULL. EUR. COM-
MUNrry (3/84)(Memorandum of the Commission).
42 Id. Summary, at I.
43 Id. 1 44, at 27.
44 Id. 46, at 29.
45 Id. 59, at 35.
46 The Court, in its examination of Article 74, stressed that the "objectives of the Treaty ...
namely the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted,
are equally applicable to the transport sector." New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
16,777. Air transport is therefore to be included in the competition rules along with "other modes of
transport ...." Id. at 16,778.
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Resolution under these articles seemed appropriate since "[i]n the devel-
opment of Community policies the greatest progress has come from the
impetus provided by the provisions of the EEC Treaty."'47
C. Prior Court of Justice Decisions
No previous decisions by the Court of Justice directly addressed the
issue of whether air transport was subject to EEC competition rules.
Several decisions, however, indicated a willingness by the Court of Jus-
tice to extend application of these rules to such situations. This willing
attitude paralleled a similar trend found in the formal statements of EEC
policy by the Commission in recent years. 48
The initial step came in 1974 with what is commonly referred to as
the French Seaman case.49 There the Court of Justice considered Article
84(2) of the EEC Treaty, which defines the scope of treaty provisions
relating to transport policy in general. The Court held that "sea and air
transport.., remain, on the same basis as the other modes of transport,
subject to the general rules of the Treaty."50 Under this rationale, the
competition rules of Articles 85 and 86 may be interpreted as applying to
sea and air transport, despite their exclusion from other transport provi-
sions, because they are part of the general treaty provisions.
Additional support for the application of Articles 85 and 86 to air
transport is found in Commission v. Belgium.51 In this case, the Court of
Justice held that aid to transport cannot be exempted "from the general
system of the treaty concerning aid granted by the States and from the
controls and the procedures laid down therein."5 " Application of this
decision to the air transport sector would make any aid from a Member
State to an airline subject to Articles 85 and 86, which prohibit abuse of a
dominant position in the marketplace. Since state-owned airlines are
usually the largest airlines in a given Member State, any subsidy to the
airline could be construed as a violation of Community competition law.
Articles 85 and 86 are not always determinative of competition vio-
lations. Where "purely national systems" are involved, the Court has
47 Stanbrook, supra note 35, at 56.
48 See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
49 French Republic, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8270.
50 Id. at 371, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 9191-94.
51 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1881, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8513 (1978).
52 Id. at 1894-95, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7282.
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held that Community competition rules do not apply.5 3 The airline in-
dustry, despite its close ties with national governments, depends on in-
ternational networks to such an extent that it is clearly not a "purely
national system."
The nature of the air transport industry within the EEC, confined as
it is by its international origins and present status of bilateralism,
54
throws the protectionist interests of the Member States into sharp con-
flict with the Community's stated competitive goals. Interpretation and
application of the New Frontiers decision will help resolve these conflicts.
III. THE NEW FRONTIERS CASE
A. The French National Court Decisions
1. Tribunal de Police
In a criminal proceeding brought in the Tribunal de Police (the local
criminal court), several airlines and their directors, as well as several
travel agencies and their directors, were charged with violating certain
provisions of the French Civil Aviation Code.5 The relevant statutes
provided that all proposed air fares be submitted and approved by the
French Minister for Civil Aviation. 6 The defendants were charged with
offering unapproved air fares that undercut those officially approved.
The Tribunal de Police interpreted the relevant provisions of the
Civil Aviation Code as applicable to the airlines, but not to the travel
agencies or their directors.5 7 It then found that compliance with the stat-
utes required each airline to "draw up tariffs for each individual route
and submit them to the Minister for approval on pain of criminal
penalties."5 8
53 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) at 16,786-87 (citing Leclerc v. Au Ble Vert, 1985
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 114,237 (1985)).
54 An estimated 325 separate bilateral agreements among 26 countries currently govern Euro-
pean air travel. EC Ministers Fail to Reach Accord on Measures to Liberalize Air Travel, 52 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 754 (April 16, 1987).
55 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) at 16,774. See also id. at 16,781 (Opinion of the
Advocate Gen.).
56 Id. at 16,774. Article L 330-3 of the French Civil Aviation Code requires that the Minister of
Aviation approve all undertakings engaged in air transport. The various items that the Minister
must approve are specified in Article R 330-9. These items include air tariffs, which will be consid-
ered approved if, within one month, the Minister makes no objections. Article R 330-15 provides for
penalties including fines and imprisonment for violations.
57 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,781-82 (Opinion of the Advocate Gen.).
58 Id. As the Court pointed out, "A decision approving the tariff proposed by an airline there-
fore has the effect of rendering that tariff binding on all traders selling tickets of that company in
respect of the journey specified in the application for approval." Id. at 16,774. It is this effect that
the defendants contended contravened EEC competition rules.
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The significance of the Tribunal de Police decision lies in its com-
ments on the compatibility of the French Code provisions with the com-
petition provisions of the EEC Treaty. The Tribunal de Police first
determined that "those provisions [of the Civil Aviation Code], which
call for a concerted practice between airlines, undoubtedly have as their
effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
Common Market" in violation of Article 85.1' Based on this finding, the
Tribunal concluded that the validity of the French laws in this context
"can be settled only by the Court of Justice of the European Economic
Community., 60 The case was thus referred to that body for a prelimi-
nary ruling on the issues.
2. Cour d'Appel
The Minist~re Public (Public Prosecutor's Department) appealed to
the Cour d'Appel (Court of Appeal) seven days after the Tribunal de
Police decision. The Cour d'Appel refused to determine the admissibility
of the appeal immediately, "since that was not necessary in the interests
of the proper administration of justice. '6 1 All criminal proceedings at
the national level were stayed pending the outcome of the case in the
Court of Justice.62
B. The Court of Justice Decision
In concluding that each Member State has an obligation to ensure
that no aviation concern or group of concerns prohibits, restricts, or dis-
torts competition as provided in Article 85,63 the Court considered five
issues: 1) jurisdiction; 2) international air transport rules; 3) applicability
of treaty competition rules to air transport; 4) consequences of absence of
implementing legislation for air transport competition rules; and 5) com-
patibility with Community law of national tariff approval procedures.
After upholding its jurisdiction to decide the case,' the Court sum-
marized the history of air transport from the Convention to the present,
emphasizing the tradition of price-fixing in bilateral agreements. In
59 Id. at 16,782 (Opinion of the Advocate Gen.).
60 Id. The Court of Justice never ruled on whether the French Civil Aviation Code provisions
do indeed violate Article 85. See infra note 132.
61 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,782 (Opinion of the Advocate Gen.).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 16,781.
64 Id. at 16,775. In reaching its decision on jurisdiction, the Court viewed as irrelevant the
existence of international airline agreements. It also disregarded the Tribunal's failure to specify
applicable Community law provisions in its referral to the Court of Justice.
65 Id. at 16,775-76. For a more detailed discussion of air transport, see supra notes 15-26.
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considering "whether Community law entails obligations for the Member
States under Article 5 of the treaty regarding competition in the air
transport sector,"'66 the Court found that a number of treaty provisions,
including Articles 85 and 86, provided no bar to the application of the
competition provisions to air transport.67
In considering whether the national authorities or the Commission
should determine violations of the competition rules,68 the Court found
that the "appropriate authorities" of each Member State must make
these determinations in the absence of any regulations approved by the
Commission. Relying on its prior decisions, the Court held that these
"authorities," as used in Article 88, refer to administrative authorities
subject to review by competent courts, as well as to courts in Member
States that traditionally have applied domestic competition law.69 The
Court questioned-and found wanting-the competence of a criminal
court (such as the Tribunal de Police) to perform such a function.70
Proper implementation of EEC competition law would be governed
by the principle of "provisional validity. ' 71 This principle states that
agreements predating official regulation are presumed valid "unless and
until" Member State authorities or the Commission decide that an in-
fringement of Article 85 has occurred.72 Under the Court's application
of the provisional validity principle, air transport agreements cannot be
ruled automatically void under Article 85(2) by a national court "unless
and until" a decision establishing an Article 85(1) violation emerges from
the appropriate Member State authorities or the Commission.73 Absent
66 Id. at 16,776. Article 5 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appropriate for en-
suring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from the acts of
the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's
aims.
They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives
of this Treaty.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
67 The Court specified Articles 84, 74, 61, 42, 43, and 85-90. New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) at 16,776-78.
68 Id. at 16,778. Article 88 of the Treaty indicates that in the absence of any measures imple-
menting Articles 85 and 86, responsibility falls on the Member States; Article 89 indicates that the
Commission has concurrent authority in such a situation.
69 Id. at 16,778 (citing BRT v. SABAM, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8268 (1977)).
70 Id. at 16,778-80.
71 The Court established the provisional validity principle in de Geus v. Bosch, 1962 E. Comm.
Ct. 3. Rep. 45, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8003 (1962).
72 Burnside, Cheaper Air Fares in Europe-The European Court's New Frontier, L. Soc'y GA-
ZEtrE, July 9, 1986, at 2167. The Member States would act under their power in Article 88 to make
such a decision; the Commission's power to do so lies in Article 89.
73 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,779.
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implementing rules, a national court has no jurisdiction to find violations
of Article 85."
The Court also contemplated the practical effects of its decision to
apply the treaty competition rules to the air transport sector and its pric-
ing procedures. Given the network of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments among nations accustomed to directing and subsidizing their
airlines, the Court attempted to delineate how treaty competition rules
should affect existing practices and laws. The Court noted the duty im-
posed on Member States "not to adopt or maintain in force any measure
that could deprive [Articles 85 and 86] of their effectiveness,"75 and con-
cluded that where the Commission or competent national authorities de-
termined fare pricing procedures violated Article 85, approval of such
procedures would be "contrary to the obligations of the Member States
in the field of competition."76 Thus, the Court gave responsibility to the
Member States first to determine violations, and then to conform pricing
approval procedures accordingly.
IV. IMPACT ON THE EEC AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Although the Court's opinion stresses deregulation of the air trans-
port industry in Europe, whether true competition is actually introduced
remains to be seen. Imperfectly and incompletely structured enforce-
ment procedures,77 anticipated reluctance by Member States,78 and the
absence of definitive substantive rulings may thwart implementation of
the decision.79 Furthermore, attempts may be made to channel this re-
luctance through exemptions under Articles 85(3) and 90(2).10 For small
private airlines, these conditions may well render the New Frontiers deci-
sion an exercise in tokenism, effectively preventing a notable improve-
ment in their competitive positions in the Community.
A. Enforcement Difficulties
Enforcement of the competition rules may prove far more difficult
than the mere announcement of their applicability to air transport. The
74 Id. at 16,780.
75 Id. (citing INNO v. ATAB, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2115, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442 (1977)).
76 Id. at 16,780.
77 See infra notes 92-114 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text
79 The holding of the case evades a substantive determination of whether or not a violation did in
fact occur. See infra note 132.
80 See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
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Member States' conflicting national and Community duties81 and restric-
tions on the governing EEC institutions82 may hinder reporting and in-
vestigation of prohibited practices. Those practices could conceivably
continue, despite their contravention of Article 85.
L Member State Interests
Member States have a vested interest in avoiding strict application
of the competition rules. From a Member State's point of view, competi-
tion could adversely affect not only the terms of bilateral agreements and
the functioning of international organizations like the IATA, but could
also force closure of unprofitable, subsidized routes. Since every Member
State owns all-or at least a significant part-of its national airline, 3
each Member is often involved in fixing tariffs and subsidizing unprofita-
ble routes.8 4 In addition, Member States view United States deregulation
as encouraging regional airlines at the expense of larger, established car-
riers. This assessment contributes to their reluctance to apply any com-
petition law strictly. 5
To date, the Member State practices of subsidy and tariff-fixing have
effectively barred smaller private airlines from entering or surviving in
the European market.8" By disrupting "the competitive market forces of
supply and demand," national airlines have succeeded in maintaining ar-
tificially high air fares.8 7 These fares would be threatened by competi-
tion. In addition to these anti-competitive practices, changing the
current air transport regime has political costs. The operation of most
national European airlines by overstaffed management and unions88 dims
the prospects for increased competition. These groups, obviously op-
posed to deregulation, are not easily overcome.89  Further, Member
States wish to maintain the stability and prominence of their "national
flag carriers." 90
81 Community duties of Member States include a variety of activities designed to integrate Mem-
ber States' markets and abolish barriers to trade. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3.
82 See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84 Comment, supra note 6, at 365.
85 Id. at 385-86.
86 Id. Sir Freddie Laker, for example, was unable to compete successfully. In addition, Virgin
Atlantic does not foresee any concessions that might allow it a better chance at competing. See infra
note 140 and accompanying text.
87 Comment, supra note 6, at 365.
88 Dagtoglou, supra note 6, at 340.
89 Id.
90 Id. Dagtoglou also points to arguments against deregulation based on issues such as flight
safety, general social policy, financial risks, and potential breaches of international agreements. Id.
at 351-52. For arguments against the introduction of competition to air transport, see Comment,
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Member States, while bound on the one hand by a duty to the Com-
munity to promote harmonious economic development under Article 5
of the EEC Treaty, find themselves bound on the other hand by obliga-
tions to their own national interests. The Court of Justice has placed
these two duties in direct conflict. It is only through the determination
and execution of enforcement procedures that the New Frontiers decision
can have an effective impact on the European airline industry.91
2. Community Government Structure
The EEC's bureaucratic structure increases the difficulties of en-
forcement present in the difficult situation described above. Four bodies
govern the European Economic Community: the Council, the Commis-
sion, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice.92 The Parliament and
Commission act as advisers to the Council, which bears ultimate respon-
sibility for setting official policies and regulations that bind members of
the Community.93 With respect to air transport policy, Article 84(2) of
the treaty exclusively authorizes the Council to adopt an official policy.94
The Court is not technically responsible for "procedural adoption"
laws.95 Nonetheless, the Court declared in New Frontiers that the com-
petition laws apply to air transport, even though no procedural rules gov-
erning their application exist.96 Absent such procedural rules, there is no
enforcement mechanism to compel application of the decision. More-
over, there is little likelihood that these necessary procedures will be
adopted promptly. The Commission has reserved its opinion on how far
to extend liberalization of air transport policy, and the Member States
continue to disagree on matters of pricing, capacity, and market access.97
Meetings of the European transport ministers in June 1987 failed to pro-
duce agreement on air transport deregulation policy.98 While the Coin-
supra note 6, at 385-87. For more information on the safety factors, see Mr. Clinton Davis An-
nounces Conference in 1987 on Airline Safety, Europe, No. 4405, Oct. 9, 1986, at 8.
91 See infra notes 95-114, 132-42 and accompanying text.
92 Comment, supra note 6, at 367 (citing EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 137-209).
93 Id. at 367-69.
94 See id. at 373.
95 Id. at 369.
96 See supra note 68. The Commission, while reserving its opinion as to general air transport
developments, has found some of the airlines' agreements incompatible with the treaty provisions
despite the lack of Council-approved regulations on the subject. Transport: The Twelve Have Made
Considerable Progress Toward a Compromise on Gradual Liberalization of Air Transport, Differences
Persist and Commission Reserves an Opinion, Europe, No. 4405, Oct. 9, 1986, at 7 [hereinafter The
Twelve Have Made Progress].
97 For a discussion of EEC air transport policy, see supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
98 Commission to Pursue Airline Reforms, Fin. Times, July 2, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (int'l ed.). This
failure stemmed from Spain's refusal to approve a package of proposals. The defeated package fea-
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mission has renewed efforts to bring the airlines into compliance with the
competition rules, it has not initiated proposals for the airline industry
under the Single European Act, a structural reinvigoration of the EEC
Treaty.99
As if the sheer weight of EEC bureaucracy were not enough to slow
progress, the composition of each body of representatives of the Member
States may also inhibit procedural development. Particularly since "the
Council Members act at the direction of their governments," and since
those governments are so closely tied to their respective airlines, 101 any
significant dissent among Member States must be eliminated before final
implementing procedures are approved. The tenor of meetings of the
EEC transport ministers has been unfavorable in this respect. 10 2
In the absence of implementing legislation, the treaty allows each
Member State to determine infringements of the competition provi-
sions. 0 3 Member State administration of the competition laws may lead
to inconsistent application. "Member States would be free to interpret
the competition laws to their individual benefit .... [T]he competition
laws would only be invoked when convenient, and would have little sig-
nificant impact in promoting a more competitive EEC airline indus-
try.'104  In addition, only the appropriate national authorities may act
under law.105 It is not always clear, however, who these authorities are
or who determines their right to act.10 6 All these factors suggest that
tured fare discounts, decreased capacity sharing, and increased market access, all of which could
have led to the addition of 170 flights to Europe's 30 busiest routes. A Rock on the Runway, The
Times (London), July 5, 1987, at 25, col. 5.
99 The Single Act: A New Frontier for Europe, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY (Supp. No.
l)(1987)(Communication from the Commission to the Council). See also Commission to Pursue
Airline Reforms, supra note 98. The Single European Act became effective on July 1, 1987. Id.
Among other modifications of the EEC Treaty, this Act requires Commission proposals to pass
Parliament before vote by transport ministers takes place; at that point only a majority and not a
unanimity of ministers' votes is necessary. A Rock on the Runway, supra note 98.
t00 Comment, supra note 6, at 370 n.53.
101 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
102 An October 1986 meeting illustrates these problems. At that meeting Germany and France
were generally in accord with suggested policy measures, but Denmark, Spain, and Greece found
them too liberal and the Netherlands found them too conservative. The Twelve Have Made Progress,
supra note 96, at 7-8. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 88, 89.
IO4 Comment, supra note 6, at 373 (citing Letter from K. Hammarskjold, Office of the Director
General, IATA, to G. Constogeorgis, Commissioner, European Economic Community [hereinafter
Hammerskjold Letter]).
105 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
106 Reuben, Air Transport in Europe: New Perspectives for Competition Law?, 136 NEw L.J. 160,
161 (1986)(examining a wide range of possible "appropriate authorities" within Great Britain, in-
cluding the Director General of Fair Trading, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the Secre-
tary of State, and the Civil Aviation Authority).
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effective steps may not be taken to invalidate price-fixing agreements.
Difficulties arise for the Commission in this situation because it has
no authoritative, Council-approved procedures on which to rely. The
investigatory powers of the Commission under Article 89 are dependent
upon cooperation from the Member States. '0 7 In the unlikely event that
a Member State reports its own violations of the competition provisions,
the Commission would still rely upon that State to enforce any of its
proposed remedial measures. 10 8
The conflict between Member State interests in nationalized airlines
and a deregulated Community air transport policy exacerbate the weak-
nesses in the Community's governing structure and in the New Frontiers
decision itself. The result is an absence of uniformity0 9 and certainty as
to what the law actually means. 01 The New Frontiers decision does not
assign any positive substantive duties to the Member States, it only delin-
eates what is "contrary" to their treaty obligations. 11'
Some steps to enforce a competitive policy have been taken, albeit
slowly. On July 9, 1986, the Commission first gave Member States a
waiting period during which to improve their airlines' price-fixing behav-
ior. After this period expired, the Commission sent letters to ten airlines
warning them to desist in their cartel practices." 2 Seven airlines re-
sponded positively to this measure, while Lufthansa, Alitalia, and
Olympic Airways persisted in fixing fares, pooling revenues, and dividing
routes.' 13 After the Council's failure to reach an official policy position,
107 Comment, supra note 6, at 374.
108 Id. Furthermore, "[an independent decision by either the Commission or the Court of Jus-
tice with regard to the application of the competition laws would not achieve the community goal of
adopting a common air transport policy." Id. at 374-75.
109 Id. at 373 (citing Hammarskjold Letter, supra note 104).
11o Id. at 375 n.91.
111 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,781. The Opinion of the Advocate General
interprets "a line of decisions" of the Court as requiring "the Member States not to adopt or main-
tain in force any measures that might enable the airlines to escape from the constraints imposed by
the competition rules in the treaty, or, more specifically, to coordinate their flight tariffs." Id. at
16,795-96. The Advocate General does not, however, discuss whether the Member States are imme-
diately to break off all such agreements possibly in violation of the rules, or whether the Member
States are to report themselves or other Member States. Neither is it clear what will become of the
IATA and its tariff coordinating services. As KLM and Air France argue, any obligations of the
Member States must "be given a sufficiently specific content" in order to be operable. Id. at 16,786.
112 Commissioner Warns Airlines to End Cartel Practices, Fin. Times, July 10, 1986 (int'l ed.).
Those airlines included British Airways, British Caledonian, Sabena, SAS, Lufthansa, Air France,
and KLM. Id. The Commission is now reviewing the replies. EC Fails to Free Civil Aviation;
Airlines Will Face Antitrust Changes, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 94 (Jan. 15, 1987)
[hereinafter EC Fails to Free Civil Aviation].
113 EC Commission Declares Illegal Cartel Arrangement of Airlines, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 655 (Apr. 2, 1987)[hereinafter Illegal Cartel Arrangement]. The Commission has de-




the Commission indicated it would be willing to pursue enforcement ac-
tion against the airlines in court.
1 14
B. Treaty Exemption Provisions
1. Article 85(3)
Article 85(3) exempts any concerted activity or agreement between
commercial undertakings that contributes "to the improvement of the
production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or
economic progress.... .115 This article's only proviso is that consumers
be allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit.' 16 This exemption does
not, however, tolerate undue restrictions on or substantial reductions in
competition.117
At least three EEC governments contend that this provision sup-
ports "their powers to approve air tariffs even where those tariffs are
coordinated between the airlines concerned," as long as such powers are
not used "for exclusively protectionist purposes."11 The Commission
has recognized that airline participation in setting air fares, done pursu-
ant to bilateral agreements negotiated between Member States, does not
directly violate Articles 85 and 86.119 To the extent such agreements
promote economic and technical progress, it is arguable that they do not
contravene Article 85(l).12O
2. Article 90
Article 90 provision subjects public enterprises in the EEC to treaty
to discuss the matter with the Commission. EC Commission is One Step Closer to Deregulation of
Airline Sector, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 913 (May 14, 1987).
114 EC Fails to Free Civil Aviation, supra note 112.
115 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(3).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 France, Italy and the Netherlands contend that their powers to coordinate air tariffs should
not be eliminated unless the criteria set out in Article 85(3) are no longer met. New Frontiers, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,786 (Opinion of the Advocate Gen.).
119 Comment, supra note 6, at 379 n. 133 (citing COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 22, 23 (1981)).
120 For discussion of how such regulation has encouraged the development of the air transport
industry, see supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. It is arguable, of course, whether the con-
sumer is indeed being allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
85(3). A recent study by Dr. Sean Barrett indicates "that average fare levels within Europe are now
two-and-a-half times dearer than internal American fares." Sky High Too Long, The Times
(London), May 3, 1986. While it may be unfair to judge European air fares against deregulated
American fares, the point is that a thick layer of benefit exists that is not being realized by the EEC
consumer. On the basis of these figures, it would be difficult to justify an Article 85(3) exemption.
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rules, particularly treaty competition rules. 121 To the extent that the en-
forcement of such rules impairs the ability of the undertaking to perform
its public duties, Article 90(2) prevents application of the rules. 122 Since
they are public in nature, 123 the European national airlines may contend
that despite the New Frontiers decision, treaty competition rules do not
govern their activities.
124
Advocate General Carl Lenz noted in his opinion to New Frontiers
that before Article 90(2) can operate to exempt the airlines from the
competition rules, all other avenues of redress within the treaty must be
exhausted, including Article 85(3).125 "Since even coordinated tariffs
may be exempted from the prohibition on cartels under Article 85(3) of
the treaty, I [the Advocate General] am unable to see how the applica-
tion of Article 85 to the fixing of air tariffs can be shown to be incompati-
ble with the tasks assigned to the airlines."' 126 It is therefore not at all
certain that an exemption under Article 90(2) would be granted.
In addition to expressing his doubts as to the viability of an Article
90(2) exemption, the Advocate General further noted that the Court of
Justice had left the issue open for discussion. 127  The Court's previous
decisions have indicated that while enterprises that enjoy "dominant po-
sition" and "certain privileges," such as ports, may be granted an exemp-
tion under Article 90(2), 128 that provision cannot "create individual
121 Article 90 provides in relevant part:
1. Member States shall, in respect of public enterprises and enterprises to which they
grant special or exclusive rights, neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to
the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular, to those rules provided for in Article 7 and in
Articles 85 to 94 inclusive.
2. Any enterprise charged with the management of services of general economic interest
or having the character of a fiscal monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this
Treaty, in particular to those governing competition, to the extent that the application of such
rules does not obstruct the dejure or de facto fulfillment of the specific tasks entrusted to such
enterprise. The development of trade may not be affected to such a degree as would be contrary
to the interests of the Community.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90.
122 Id.
123 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
124 This view is shared by many: "There has been widespread consensus that air transport enter-
prises are enterprises in the sense of Article 90, para. 2 which are entrusted with tasks of 'general
economic interest.'" Weber, Air Transport in the Common Market and the Public Air Transport
Enterprises, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 283, 289 (1980)(discussing the applicability of Article 90(2)
to both scheduled and charter airlines).
125 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,794-95.
126 Id. at 16,795 (emphasis in original); see also supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
127 New Frontiers at 16,794.
128 Weber, supra note 124, at 290 (citing Public Prosecution of Luxembourg v. Hein n6e Muller
("Port of Mertert"), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 1 8140 (1971)).
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rights which the national courts must protect." '129 The fact that a high
degree of proof of harm must be shown, 130 coupled with the reluctance of
the Court of Justice to make such rulings, renders the success of such an
exemption claim doubtful.1
3 1
C. The Impact on Independent Airlines
The New Frontiers decision does not appreciably improve the posi-
tion of private airlines seeking to compete in the Common Market. The
decision is ambiguous because it simultaneously requires application of
the competition rules while avoiding any direct finding of violations.
132
This lack of clarity, stemming from the absence of implementing regula-
tion, leads to the conclusion that the airlines involved are "protected
against individual action for as long as there is a legislative vacuum
under the relevant articles of the EEC Treaty."
133
The proof that this absence of procedural rules for enforcement of
the decision will preclude successful suits for price-fixing is found in the
September 11, 1986, decision of the Queen's Bench Division of the Brit-
ish High Court.'34 Lord Bethell, bringing a suit aimed at striking down
cartel practices among the airlines,' 35 alleged price-fixing, revenue pool-
ing, and fixing of service on the London-Amsterdam route by British
Airways and KLM, in violation of Article 85.136 The two airlines had
entered into a bilateral pricing agreement for the route and advertised a
roundtrip fare of £49. Since no seats remained available at this price
when Lord Bethell flew, he had to pay £144 for a seat identical to the
129 New Frontiers, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,794 (citing Port of Mertert, 1971 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. at 730, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7606).
130 Id. at 16,794-95; see also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
131 This conclusion does not suggest that no such claims will be attempted. Indeed, arguments in
Weber, supra note 124, at 289-94, indicate that a strong case could be made for such claims,
although the provisions of Article 90(2) would not automatically apply to airlines.
132 As one commentator points out, the French statutes were not found to violate treaty competi-
tion law. This observation reinforces the potential weight of policy decisions by the Commission and
gives greater power to the Member States in determining violations of Article 85. Ministers'Meeting
Today on Airline Deregulation, Int'l Herald Trib., June 30, 1986.
133 Air Transport: The Leading Airlines Note That the Court Judgment Recognizes That No In-
fringement of the Community Competition Rules Has Been Made By Any of Them, Europe, No.
4360, May 8, 1986 (quoting K. Neumeister, Secretary General of the Association of European
Airlines).
134 See UK Court Won't Entertain Case Attacking Collusion By Airlines, 51 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 475 (Oct. 2, 1986)(the case brought by Lord Bethell before the Queen's Bench
Division was dismissed)[hereinafter UK Court]; Bethell Loses Point in Air Fare Fight, The Times
(London), Sept. 12, 1986.
135 For discussion of Lord Bethell's previous attempt to break up airline cartel practices, see
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
136 See UK Court, supra note 134.
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lower fare seats. 3 7 In dismissing the case, the British High Court relied
on the Court of Justice's New Frontiers decision and the interpretation
that "its effect [was] suspended until applied in accordance with proce-
dures set out by Articles 88 and 89. '38 Until the Commission and the
Member States agree upon implementing rules, the decision will have no
practical effect.
Private undertakings, such as the former Laker Airways and the
newer Virgin Atlantic, may perhaps find a more encouraging market in
their native Great Britain than elsewhere in the Community. 139 The fact
remains, however, that such airlines will not be able to gain entry and
remain on equal footing with national airlines until deregulation, how-
ever modified, occurs. Some degree of competition must pervade the
market before carriers without government backing can operate effec-
tively. 14 The New Frontiers decision has done little to ensure this result.
Additional uncertainties in the decision may further delay its effec-
tive application. For example, the decision does not specify what is to be
done in the event that two Member States reach different conclusions as
to the validity of mutual pricing agreements under Article 85. Also, no
specific approach is set out for application of Article 86 to competition
violations."' Finally, there remains the unresolved problem of interna-
tional pricing agreements involving non-EEC countries.14 2 These ques-
tions raise even more barriers to the use of the New Frontiers decision to
promote truly competitive behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
A complete and definitive statement of EEC air transport competi-
tion policy is long overdue. While New Frontiers is neither complete nor
definitive, it is nonetheless a starting point. The complexities of both the
137 Id.
138 Id. (quoting a source at British Airways).
139 Britain has been the most progressive of the Member States with respect to a liberalized air
policy. In addition to planning for at least partial privatization of British Airways, Britain has "led
the fight to abandon the secret agreements between airlines." Osborn, EEC Tries to Force Airlines to
Cut Fares, Daily Telegraph, July 10, 1986.
140 The owner of Virgin Atlantic, Richard Branson, commented just after the New Frontiers deci-
sion was issued that he planned to apply for a license on a particular route and that he anticipated
disapproval. Air Industry Governed by Treaty of Rome, supra note 8. Although the Commission has
urged any airlines encountering such problems to contact its officials for assistance, id., it does not
seem probable in light of the prevailing interpretations of the New Frontiers decision that the Com-
mission would actually take the national airlines or Member States to court on behalf of smaller
private airlines.
141 Currently, an Article 86 charge against Lufthansa is being investigated. Illegal Cartel Ar-
rangement, supra note 113.




industry and its regulation, however, prevent the decision from resolving
the difficulties of applying the EEC Treaty competition rules to air trans-
port. In fact, the decision's procedural shortcomings only add to the
problem.
It will probably be years before all the ramifications of the decision
are fully understood and related procedures and responsibilities clearly
described. It will probably be years beyond that point before smaller
private airlines in the Community realize a competitive gain. 143 Mean-
while, however, the irrefutable fact remains that the Court of Justice has
stated unequivocally that treaty competition rules apply to air transport.
A framework now exists, incomplete as it may be, and the efforts of the
Court to clarify initial responsibilities within that framework encourage
its success. More importantly, the decision's link to the EEC Treaty en-
sures valuable continuity and stability to the air transport system in the
EEC.
Virginia J. Clarke
143 This is especially true as the large European airlines begin discussing mergers as a means of
competing effectively with the large United States airlines that are moving rapidly and relatively
inexpensively into the European market. European Airlines Discuss Joining Forces, Wall St. J., June
10, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
